How, then, can society balance the risks and benefits of research on this and other highly virulent pathogens that have the potential for “dual use”? The risks and benefits should be considered well in advance. Plans for appropriate biosafety and biosecurity must be rigorously reviewed. Whether current oversight of training and adherence to biosafety requirements, either in the United States or internationally, is adequate remains unclear. Improved training for investigators in all these areas is needed, as has been emphasized by the NSABB (20 - 21). Free and open exchange of data is a cornerstone of modern science. However, there are circumstances in which the information generated creates a significant risk for misuse. Review by an independent, expert, accountable, and transparent group of scientists, such as the NSABB, is an appropriate method and I believe much more acceptable than direct oversight by government authorities. The advantages of NSABB review were already demonstrated after the remarkable creation of replicating an infectious 1918 pandemic influenza virus using sequences generated from molecular fragments recovered from lung tissue of a victim and formalin fixed tissue (22 - 23). At the time, some security experts contended that the data were too dangerous to publish. The manuscripts were reviewed by the NSABB, which recommended publication with only minor revisions to describe the biosafety precautions and to emphasize the potential value of the work. Since then, characterization of the 1918 virus has continued to provide critical insights into influenza pathogenesis (24 - 27). In my opinion, the NSABB has, to date, successfully navigated between the Scylla of zealous censorship by security officials and the Charybdis of facilitating deliberate misuse of the data. However, we still seem to lack a readily transparent and thoughtful mechanism to provide the details to those with a legitimate need for the data and to decide who those individuals should be. We now have an unprecedented ability to learn about pathogenicity and epidemic potential in nature, often by creating potentially more dangerous pathogens in our laboratories. We must have a careful and balanced approach that is neither too timid in permitting the performance and sharing of critical research nor too irresponsible in confronting the biosecurity issues posed by that research.